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The impact of national context effects on HRM practices in 
Russian subsidiaries of Western MNCs 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the research on comparative human resource management by 
providing a model of the Russian business system and its impact on HRM practices at 
Russian subsidiaries of Western MNCs. Whitley’s approach was adopted in order to illustrate 
the links between institutional arenas, business systems, and HRM practices. The empirical 
part is based on interviews with senior HR managers of Western MNCs operating in Russia. 
The findings provide insight into the interaction between the national business system and 
HRM practices in Russia.  
 
Introduction 
Russia is the largest European country, and its market potential is very attractive for 
foreign investors. However, dealing with Russian culture and institutions has proved 
problematic for many foreign investors (Dixon, et al, 2014). Attempts to understand the 
situation of foreign investors have had to cope with the complex process of the transition to a 
market economy and the prevalence of unpredictable informal institutions in Russia. In this 
paper we focus on human resource management (HRM) practices to answer the question of 
the impact of national context effects on such practices in the Russian subsidiaries of Western 
Multinational Companies (MNCs). We use the Business Systems approach developed by 
Whitley (1999) which has been used before to analyze HRM (Brewster et al, 2015) and is 
here applied for the first time to the Russian context.  
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Western MNCs operating in Russia were taken as the main focus of this research, 
illustrating how the interaction of various business systems can influence the formation 
process of HRM practices in subsidiaries of MNCs. This process depends on the interaction 
effects of the institutional environments of the home- and host-country (Tempel, Wachter and 
Walgenbach, 2006) in addition to dominance-effects (Edwards and Ferner, 2002) and other 
external and internal factors like pressures for international integration, the company strategy, 
structure and micro-political aspects (Almond et al., 2005). 
The host-country effects, which include cultural, legal, social, economic, and political 
systems in the country where a subsidiary is located (Dowling et al., 1999), push MNCs to 
respond to the local context (Doz, 1986; Morschett and Schramm-Klein, 2010). The home 
country effects, or country-of-origin effects, on the other hand, represent the set of elements 
of the behavior of the MNC, which has its roots in the characteristics of the national business 
system from which the MNC originates (Tempel et al., 2006). At the same time, MNCs might 
adopt management practices from such dominant economies like the USA, in the belief that 
these practices would bring success (Almond, 2005). Further, MNC strategies may have an 
impact as companies may choose to exploit conditions in a particular locale rather than seek 
for standardization (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004). As a result of the interaction of these 
different effects, most of the observed practices in subsidiaries are ‘hybrid’ practices (Ferner 
et al. 2004: 306). Notwithstanding, identification of local practices among hybrid ones would 
allow measuring the impact of host country effects. 
Figure 1 illustrates the research focus and various impacts on subsidiary HRM 
practices.   
 
Figure 1. Key influences on the HRM practices of a MNC’s subsidiary 
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Theoretical framework 
A comparative institutional approach was commonly used by scholars to study how 
MNCs interact with host county institutions and how this influences their management of 
human resources (Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Notwithstanding, the analysis of 
capitalisms proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001) cannot be applied to Russia, since they are 
focused only on developed capitalist economies. Whitley’s (1999) theoretical framework of 
business systems indicates how such a comparative analysis of established market economies 
can be extended to understand the transformation process from state socialist economies, 
highlighting both the path-dependent nature of large-scale economic change and the often 
contradictory effects of institutional transformations (Wachter et al., 2003). 
According to Whitley (1999), four major institutional arenas determine the business 
system of a country and influence national business practices: the regulating role of the state 
in the economy; the structure of the financial sector and the ways that companies have to 
obtain access to capital; the education system and the systems for skills development and 
control; and the cultural values shaping trust and authority in work and managerial 
relationships. All these elements play an important role in the work culture of a country and 
in HRM practices. The characteristics of the four major institutions represent specific 
characteristics of business systems within a country (Table 1). Whitley identified six general 
types of business systems, which can be found across the globe. They are Fragmented, 
Coordinated industrial district, Compartmentalized, State organized, Collaborative, and 
Highly coordinated. Such types of business systems may not match comprehensively with 
any particular country, but they can be recognized, since their characteristics closely resemble 
the economic and political state of the studied countries. 
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Table 1 Institutional features associated with different types of business system 
 
Further, the theory suggests the ways in which firms differ between business systems 
and their relations with particular features of dominant institutions. Whitley distinguishes 
between five “ideal kinds of firms which vary principally in how much owners and managers 
can share risks and commitments, and with whom, and in the sort of strategies they develop” 
(Whitley, 1999: 75). For example, opportunistic firms can often be found in state-owned or 
controlled, developing economies; while artisanal firms are dominant in Japan.  
The next layer of Whitley’s model discussed the work systems, which were linked to 
certain types of firms and characterized by “contrasting ways of structuring tasks and jobs, of 
controlling how work is allocated, performed, and rewarded, and of structuring employment 
relationships” (Whitley, 1999:88). In order to illustrate these work systems, Whitley provided 
examples of various economies, where a particular work system prevailed. So a Taylorist 
work system was typical for compartmentalized or state-guided business systems, while a 
Negotiated system prevails where there were collaborative business systems.  
So following the links between the characteristics of four institutional arenas, key 
dimensions of six business systems, types of firms and all the way down to work systems, the 
theory enabled the identification of the common aspects for certain economy and human 
resource practices (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Whitley’s Business System Framework 
 
Host Country Effects or Russian Business System 
Based on Whitley’s theory, there is a possibility of identifying the most common 
characteristics, and consequently, the types of business system, firm, work system, and 
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eventually HRM practices in Russia. Figure 3 presents the conceptualized model of the 
Russian context according to the theoretical framework. 
 
Figure 3. Conceptualized model of Russian context 
 
In describing the model presented above, it is important to note that each level of the model is 
interlinked with the others. This helps us to build propositions for this research. 
1. Institutions 
a. State structure and policies.  
Russia’s state structure after the collapse of the USSR did not significantly change. Puffer 
and McCarthy (2007:4) noted: “government retained an ownership position in thousands of 
enterprises that were privatized, giving it ability to influence or block important strategic 
decisions within those firms”. The state retains monopoly control of the natural gas industry 
and of oil export pipelines (Hanson and Teague, 2005). Since Putin reestablished central 
control, the state has become unified and a stronger interlocutor, able to assert itself over 
private interests. Consequently, “the state takes a more ‘dirigiste’ approach in stricter 
regulation of all other segments of economic activities” (Gurkov and Zelenova, 2008:4). 
Under Putin, the state began to directly or indirectly control large Russian corporations. The 
small business sector became very weak (Basareva, 2011) due to the institutional trap, as this 
segment is restricted by widespread corruption. Despite the state’s power, formal regulatory 
institutions are not sufficiently developed to guide decisions (Galiulina, 2011), and therefore 
business people have relied upon informal institutions for decision-making. As a result, the 
Russian economy lacks intermediates (Zudin and Golikova, 2011) and horizontal and vertical 
integration. Cooperation between competitors is very weak (Hanson & Teague, 2005). 
Because of political risks, business owners are usually directly involved, creating vertical 
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integration of ownership. In addition, state coordination mechanisms lack transparency, 
forcing owners to control their businesses tightly and hold personal political negotiations. 
According to Whitley (1999), such a situation corresponds to the ‘state-guided’ business 
system, with widespread Taylorist and patriarchal work systems, characterized by low task-
fragmentation, high managerial control, low worker discretion, high separation of workers 
from managers, low employer commitment, and job-based rewards or personal evaluation of 
performance.  
b. The banking and financial system.  
Banks in Russia have not been willing to risk their money with many Russian enterprises. 
Banks are wary of the financial risks posed by enterprises and their lack of legal recourse in 
an economy where nonpayment of debts is epidemic. As a result, many banks concentrate on 
a few customers they know well and on taking control of companies. Foreign banks offer 
little relief for Russian enterprises. They have been drawn into the Russian government 
securities market, which offers high yields and none of the complications of lending money 
to troubled industrial firms (Blasi et al., 1997) even though “in the still undeveloped financial 
services sector, some organizations have begun to provide the foundation for capital markets”  
(Puffer & McCarthy, 2007:5). The undeveloped capital market sector consists of large and 
midsized privatized companies that are not yet actively traded. Such a financial system, based 
on credit, produces low cooperation among competitors and low employer-employee 
interdependence (Whitley, 1999). Companies experience high employee turnover, and 
therefore are not willing to invest in personnel development. In such an environment, there is 
a high separation between manager and worker. The credit-based financial system would 
place profit gain ahead of growth, and thus would include profit sharing in compensation 
packages and would appraise employees based on results and financial output. Rewards 
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would be tied to the employee’s position instead of skills or potential, and decided upon 
according to short-term financial results.  
d. The development, organization and control of skills.  
Walker (2006:1426) stated that: “having become dislocated from industry after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Vocational Training Colleges (Profuchilishche) recently became the 
subject of decentralizing reforms intended to make them more responsive to local labor 
market demand”. Young people still experience problems in entering the labor market, and 
therefore choose to spend more time in education, or to experiment with a number of 
different jobs. ‘Getting on’ in Russian companies is related more to personal connections and 
less to skills and education (Bjorkman et al., 2007a). Due to the gaps in Soviet public 
education, business practitioners in modern Russia are deficient in their knowledge of 
business strategy, marketing, finance, human resource management, international trade and 
foreign languages (Vlachoutsicos and Liargovas, 1999).  
The role of trade unions in Russia has also changed dramatically. Traditionally, Russian trade 
unions focused on the redistribution of social benefits and limited exchange of information 
with workers. Today, Russian trade unions are losing their power (Kozina, 2009) and do not 
represent a viable force (Gurkov and Zelenova, 2008). Trade unions lack the institutional and 
financial resources to increase their membership, provide legal advice and represent workers 
in the courts to support rank-and-file action against employers (Clarke, 2004). Although the 
formal apparatuses of collective bargaining, labor contracts and tripartite collaboration have 
been installed and the formal independence of the judiciary guaranteed, it has been difficult 
for trade unions to adapt to their new role (Blasi et al., 1997). Instead, negotiations for 
employees’ compensation have begun to be conducted on the individual level (Cheglakova, 
2008). According to Whitley (1999), the collapsed vocational training system forces MNCs 
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to implement more extensive training and decentralized bargaining would reproduce 
individual negotiation for compensation.  
e. Trust, authority and loyalty.  
Many authors argue that modern Russian managers have no trust in government, lack 
“transparency in dealing with authorities” (Camiah & Hollinshead, 2003:254) and have little 
respect for “senseless” laws (May, Puffer, McCarthy, 2005:26). “Mutual trust often exists 
within closed networks of personal relationships” (Engelhard and Nagele, 2003:269). As a 
reaction to such mistrust, relationships of blat (corruption) became vital “to gain such 
benefits as building trust in inter-enterprises relations, security of business partners and 
clients, governmental support of business activities, and access to the required resources” 
(Butler and Purchase, 2004:34).  
The management style of the Soviet enterprise can be characterized as ‘authoritarian 
paternalist’, with the enterprise director having absolute authority in the enterprise (Clarke, 
2004:8). The director would not be willing to delegate responsibilities due to the lack of 
formal procedures. According to Whitley (1999), the low level of trust encouraged direct 
supervision of work processes and an unwillingness to delegate control to managers through 
formal procedures.  
2. The Business System Characteristics 
Following the theoretical model, it is important to elucidate the business system 
characteristics that Whitley (1999) groups into three categories: ownership coordination, non-
ownership coordination, and employment relations. 
a. Ownership coordination.  
Because privatization was focused on distribution of state welfare among employees, 
today the dominant shareholders in Russia are employees and midlevel managers. Yet, these 
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shareholders have limited influence on management; none of them are strategic investors or 
management experts (Blasi et al., 1997). In the case of MNCs or banks, those who own the 
majority of shares tend to take control of the companies (Blasi et al., 1997). Large 
corporations are centralizing management functions and strategic decision making in their 
holding companies (Clarke, 2004). In the oil and gas and metallurgical sectors especially, 
vertically integrated holding companies have developed, in which companies acquired 
supplier and processing enterprises to establish an integrated production chain. Horizontally 
integrated holding companies have developed in sectors dominated by a relatively small 
number of large producers of standardized products. In an economically and politically 
uncertain environment, companies integrate in order to strengthen the position of existing 
subsidiaries by securing control of their suppliers and markets (Clarke, 2004). 
b. Non-ownership coordination.  
In Russia, there is no consensus or cooperation between large firms across major 
policy issues. The major obstacle to cooperation between competitors in Russia is a lack of 
available information (Hanson and Teague, 2005). Golovanova and Kadochnikov (2011) 
showed that despite the very low vertical and horizontal integration of machinery 
manufacturers, the IT sector is more integrated in Russia. Zudin (2011) underlined the 
tendency of Russian large and midsize companies to enter into business associations, which 
currently represent 54 % of companies. Such associations aim to lobby the government, and 
play an important role in supporting new presidential candidates and representatives of the 
leading political parties.  
c. Employment relations and work management.  
The international business community has made much of the problems presented to 
business by the absence of the rule of law in post-Soviet Russia. The two parties in a business 
agreement stand on more or less equal footing, so that there is a substantive equality 
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underlying the formal equality of the contract. The absence of an effective judicial system is 
inconvenient, but MNCs have proven to be adept at adapting to ‘local customs’, using 
‘commission payments’ and employing ‘security companies’ to secure and enforce 
contractual agreements with Russian partners. However, little attention has been paid to the 
impact of this absence of a rule of law on the position of labor. The situation with the labor 
contract is different, because there is a fundamental asymmetry of power and resources 
inherent in the wage relation. The fragile relationship between Russian workers and managers 
is marred by a history of mistrust and suspicion (May et al., 1998). 
The government favors collective agreements and promotes their wider use in large 
companies, but for small and medium-size businesses, the situation is different. There are no 
active trade unions in small businesses, and workers are usually powerless against an 
employer’s arbitrary rule because local controlling bodies (trade inspectors) rarely interfere. 
However, when an employee brings a case to court, Russian courts are inclined to take the 
side of an employee as a ‘presumed victim’. Thus, the threat to bring the case to court often 
serves as a strong argument in individual labor disputes (Gurkov and Zelenova, 2008). 
Manager–worker relationships differ according to the type of company. In Russian 
enterprises, there is a virtual ‘obsession’ among some managers to manipulate and control 
employees in order to maintain their own positions (May et al., 1998). In the case of MNCs, 
line managers have less power within a strict hierarchical structure. In any company, there is 
a strong differentiation between core and peripheral employees, and the latter are often 
discriminated against (Kalabina, 2011). 
Employer–employee interdependence is stronger in large local companies, where a 
career path can develop within the company and compensation depends on how long an 
employee has worked at the company (Kalabina, 2011). In other cases, the Russian labor 
market has high turnover and employer–employee interdependence is fairly weak.   
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According to Whitley (1999) low employee involvement in decision making is 
represented by performance appraisal, higher job standardization and simplification, so that 
skilled workers could be replaced by unskilled and cheaper ones. Rewards are based on the 
amount of standard outputs produced by each role incumbent, as distinct from their specific 
skills or personal capacities, and do not reward workers’ initiatives in solving problems. 
Based on the above information and Whitley’s theory, Tables 2 shows the linkages 
between business system characteristics, institutional features, and HRM practices.  
 
Table 2. Theoretical links between institutional features, business system and HRM 
practices.  
 
Reflecting Table 2, the following propositions were formulated: 
Recruitment and Selection 
1. The weak public training system forces companies to recruit via personal contacts and 
select experienced employees. 
Training and Development 
2. Undeveloped vocational training in business and gaps in Soviet public education result in 
deficiencies in knowledge of business studies and foreign languages, and employees require 
extensive training in those areas. 
3. The financial system based on credit reproduces low employer-employee interdependence. 
Companies experience high employee turnover, and therefore are not willing to invest in 
personnel development. 
Performance Management 
4. A low-trust environment discourages employees’ involvement in decision-making; 
employees are evaluated based on results. 
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5. Due to the lack of formal procedures and mistrust, managers are not willing to delegate 
responsibilities, instead preferring direct supervision. 
Compensation and Benefits 
6. Weak trade unions and decentralized bargaining allows individual negotiation for 
compensation and high wage differentials. 
7. In credit based financial systems rewards are tied to the employee’s position, instead of 
skills or potential, and compensation packages include profit sharing. 
 
3. HRM practices in Russia 
In order to confirm these propositions we examined traditional HRM practices used in 
Russian enterprises. First of all, it is important to mention that the concept of HRM in Russia 
is considered to be new (Fey et al., 1999). In Soviet times, the function of HRM was largely 
decentralized among five units responsible for personnel issues. As Gurkov and Zelenova 
(2008:9) described it: “The local Communist Party committee supervised general social 
atmosphere and had the final voice in all promotions. The personnel department dealt with 
routine functions of legal paperwork in hiring, firing, and performance assessment. The local 
trade union was responsible for social life, including holiday camps, kindergartens, sports and 
social events, and the most important issue, allocation of housing among employees. The 
salary department was responsible for salary administration. Finally, the special unit in direct 
supervision by the Chief Engineer dealt with issues of job design and work safety. Such 
decentralization meant that there never has been a clearly articulated human resource strategy 
at enterprise levels”.  
Even twenty years after the fall of the central planning system, personnel departments 
still do not manage human resources according to the requirements of western textbooks. In 
most cases, personnel departments are separated from strategic decisions and cannot advise 
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executives even on HRM issues (Gurkov et al., 2009), occupying the lowest rank among all 
functions in a company. There is no HRM strategy within the department (Gurkov and 
Zelenova, 2008), with line managers taking charge of HRM. However, there has been a 
positive trend in the last few years of implementing successful HRM practices in Russia 
(Dixon et al., 2014)  
a. Recruitment and Selection 
The hiring process is challenging because of Russia has a heterogeneous population in 
terms of the level and quality of education, expectations, and values, along with very weak 
information flows (Fey et al., 1999). Headhunter firms play an important role, and firms also 
use newspaper advertisements; personal contacts remain widely in use, as is traditional in 
Russia.  
Because of the lack of capability of their HRM departments, Russian companies 
prefer candidates who are capable of adjusting to a position as quickly as possible without 
any special training from the company side. Candidates’ connections with authorities are 
considered an important element in decisions about a recruit. Such candidates are recruited 
mostly through personal connections. Today, the Internet has become an important source of 
information for both employees and employers. Among all the variety of selection procedures 
possible, interviews and probation periods are the only two forms employed in most Russian 
companies. In Russia, the probation period is considered not as the beginning of real 
employment, but as a means by the employer to save on salary and benefits. In some cases 
companies terminate relations with an employee after the probation period without paying 
any salary. 
b. Training and Development 
Training among Russians is much needed (Gurkov and Zelenova, 2008); however, 
“the majority of new private employers make very little provision for the training of their 
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employees” (Clarke and Metalina, 2000:19). Companies mostly outsource training programs 
for key personnel to specialized providers. The government also organizes a “large-scale 
program with intensive theoretical classes,” followed by practical knowledge exchange with 
Western companies (Gurkov and Zelenova, 2008: 21). Recently, new business educational 
institutions providing MBA diplomas have appeared in Russia. Russian managers have 
limited traditional management training and coaching skills (Fey, Bjorkman and 
Pavlovskaya, 2000), and there have been calls to spend money on employee training 
(Shekshnia, 1994). 
c. Performance Management 
 According to Gurkov and associates (2009) the performance management of workers 
and front-line employees is based on direct observations and the registration of the quality 
and quantity of work by the supervisor. At the same time the authors noted that the formal 
appraisal system in Russia is considered to be very weak (Gurkov et al., 2009). 
d. Compensation and Benefits 
From a legal perspective, the “official system of reward management is based on two 
pillars – the minimal wage and a tariff system,” where the tariff system “scales wages 
according to the complexity of particular work and the relative level of payment for particular 
jobs of various complexities” (Gurkov and Zelenova, 2008:15). A wide dispersion of salaries 
is linked with a reluctance to reveal real incomes. In the case of a large corporation, a kind of 
reward system like stock-related rewards and profit-sharing schemes is used for top managers 
(Gurkov et al., 2009). Other types of compensation are used for all employees, such as social 
benefits (health insurance, meal and transport allowances, holiday allowance, educational 
allowance), and the thirteenth month salary is very common in Russia. 
Geographical divergence in compensation packages is a major issue for the country. 
As Oshchepkov (2009:4) noticed, “in the current situation, both groups of high- and low-
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income regions form separate convergence clusters that, in the absence of an appropriate 
federal policy, will have a tendency to diverge from one another.” 
The literature review on local HRM practices in Russia revealed that theoretical 
assumptions are relevant. Scholars have observed in Russia most of HRM practices suggested 
by the theory. This also confirms the correct identification of the business system type for 
Russia.  
 
Methods and data collection. 
The research explores the new context of transition economy and the impact of 
context on HRM practices in MNCs operating in Russia, applying theory that has never been 
tested there before. Consequently, a qualitative approach represents the most suitable way to 
discover new relationships between institutions and MNCs. Surveys in this case would not be 
appropriate since there is not yet sufficient coherence in HRM in Russia to be sure that 
respondents will interpret questions similarly. To assess the position of foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Russia we used interviews and case studies. Structured interviews were 
conducted with the HRM Directors and line managers of 12 Russian subsidiaries of large 
MNCs, leaders in their industries, originating from the USA, Germany, France, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Korea. Organizations were selected for size, subsidiaries with at least 
100 employees, and ownership, more than 75% of foreign. Because Moscow is the most 
developed region in Russia and has the highest number of MNCs operating there, and for 
reasons of practicality in this vast country, we limited our study to the Moscow region. The 
sample included a variety of industries, both in manufacturing and in services. Most of the 
subsidiaries were brownfields. 
An interview guide was adopted from Wachter et al (2003) and combined with a 
schedule used to structure the interview. Discussion was encouraged but we also used some 
closed-ended questions. The interviews were conducted in Russian.  All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and then translated in English. Results were presented and discussed 
with academic and professional experts in Russia.  
The first part of each interview was focused on contingency factors, such as date of 
foundation, size of company, etc. The next part used closed questions on work systems 
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adopted from Whitley (1999). Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale 
the degree of company commitment to retaining its core workforce and provide employment 
security, degree of task fragmentation and specialization, degree of worker discretion over 
how tasks are performed and involvement in problem solving, degree of separation of, and 
segmentation between, managers and workers in their backgrounds and skills, and degree of 
delegation of responsibilities. Then we focused on the coordination mechanisms employed by 
HQ. Here two different types of control, formal and informal were incorporated into 
questionnaire, following Martinez and Jarillo (1989). Out of a total of seven questions in this 
section the first four represented formal parent control including centralized, formalized and 
output control and planning, while the remaining three questions correspond to informal 
control socialization and networks (Myloni et al. 2006). In addition, we discusses several 
questions on HQ’s resources dependence, number of expatriates, and type of structure and 
strategy. Finally, the interviews ended with questions about HRM policies and practices and 
their transfer to Russian subsidiaries. Some were adopted from Bjorkman and Ehrnrooth 
(2000), asking respondents to indicate on a five-point Likert scale whether their subsidiary’s 
HRM practices were more similar to home country practices or to host country practices as 
an attempt to get their assessment of the way that Western MNCs adapt to local conditions in 
Russia. During the interview the respondents were asked to describe in detail their HRM 
practices based on four categories: recruitment and selection, training and development, 
performance management, and compensation and benefits. The accent here was on 
identifying whether the HRM practices described in theoretical positions were in place, and if 
so, was it the national context effect or influence from HQ that predominated. 
Qualitative data was analyzed in tabular form, wherein all interviews were combined 
in one Excel file to compare the answers. The first column of the document had analytical 
categories, and successive columns contained responses from the interviews. A comparison 
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of respondents’ answers was possible in the horizontal axis. Color-coding was applied to 
highlight the differences in the origin of studied companies.   
Findings and Discussion 
Whitley (1999) described the work system, shaped by local institutions, as an 
important influencing factor on HRM practices. We have described the typical Russian work 
system including low employer commitment, low task-fragmentation, low employee 
involvement, high worker-manager separation, and low delegation. 
Results show that US companies were more successful at retaining key employees, 
but every company worked on retention programs. Task fragmentation was also higher in US 
companies, with an algorithm of actions even for sales positions. European manufacturing 
companies had high task fragmentation only for technical positions. For service industries, 
blue collar workers’ involvement in problem diagnosis and solving was generally high, with 
two exceptions at manufacturing plants of US and French companies.  
The degree of separation between managers and workers (or lower ranking employees 
for service industries) was higher in French companies and lower in US ones. The difference 
in vacation duration underscores the degree of separation. French companies provided extra 
vacation days for managers, as did one US company, whereas a German company had the 
exact same length of vacations for managers and workers.  
None of the companies had the same work system as Russian domestic firms, 
although certain elements of the work system were found in each company. Table 3 
summarizes the work systems in studied companies. 
Table 3. Work system at Russian subsidiaries 
N 
Company origin 
Work system 
Commitment Fragmentation Involvement Separation Delegation 
1 US high some high low high 
2 US high some high some high 
3 US  high high low some some 
4 US  some some some some some 
5 German  high some high some high 
6 French  some low high high some 
7 French  some some some some  some 
8 French  high some high high high 
9 Swiss  high some high some  high 
10 Sweden  high some some low some 
11 Korea  high some high high some 
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12 Sweden high high some some high 
 
As for each subsidiary’s dependence on HQ’s financial resources, subsidiaries of US 
companies were reported to be more controlled and more dependent, whereas other 
companies allowed subsidiaries relative autonomy. The same difference was observed for 
personnel dependence, in that US companies had more centralized planning and control, 
whereas European companies allowed the subsidiaries more freedom and HQ appointed 
executive positions only. Consequently, US companies tended to use more global strategy 
with some local adaptations, whereas European companies mostly used a strategy adaptable 
to the domestic context.  
American companies executed stronger formal and informal control over their 
subsidiaries, providing them with written policies, rules and regulations, detailed planning, 
regular managers’ trainings and informal communication channels. In contrast, the French 
companies demonstrated a higher degree of autonomy, with considerable freedom in 
following HQ’s recommended guidelines, except for the production sites, which had strict 
rules and regulations with high control from the French HQ. German companies had a level 
of control similar to the French companies’, but with more detailed planning. 
Managerial control within the subsidiary was higher in American companies. The 
French companies aimed for subsidiaries to work independently. Control mechanisms such as 
integrated information systems were difficult to use in most of the companies because of the 
foreign language knowledge requirement. Two American companies claimed that they are 
integrated into the corporate information system, whereas others expressed the desire to be 
connected or to use a parallel system in the local language.  
Practices such as productivity comparisons between subsidiaries, formulated 
corporate culture and international transfer of best practices were common for every 
company. However, international standards were not applied in the German and Swedish 
companies, as they argued that different markets have different goals.  
Expatriates had the role of controlling authorities, holding the top executive positions 
(CEO, CFO) in all these companies. Because expatriates’ salaries are covered in the 
subsidiary’s budget, there are fewer of them, with the exception of companies in which 
expertise transfer is vital for business success. For these companies, independent of origin or 
industry, the number of expatriates equalled 15% of the total headcount.  
Every subsidiary of these multinational companies considered HRM important. The 
HR director was usually on the board of directors and was included in decision-making on 
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matters other than HRM strategy, indicating a strong home-country effect (Proposition 7), 
whereas in Russian companies the HRM department was much less empowered. Only two of 
the Russian subsidiaries had trade unions, and they had a very weak influence on HRM 
processes. 
Table 4 summarizes the coordination mechanisms described above; the factors in bold 
are the ones that would have the highest extent of localization.  
 
Table 4. Coordination mechanisms at Russian subsidiaries 
N 
Origin 
Coordination mechanisms 
Strategy Structure Control Expatriates Role of HR 
Trade 
unions 
HQ 
dependence 
1 US  Transnational Matrix Strict, F/I 1%, top High no Strong 
2 US  Global Product Strict, F/I 15%, top Some no Strong 
3 US  Transnational Matrix Strict, F/I 1%, top High weak Strong 
4 US  Transnational Matrix Strict, F 1%, top High no Strong 
5 German Multi-domestic Geographic Some, F/I 1%, experts High no Weak 
6 French  Global Product Some, F 15%, top High no Some 
7 French  Multi-domestic Geographic Low 0.3%, top High weak Weak 
8 French  Transnational Matrix Some -   Some 
9 Swiss  Transnational Matrix Strict, F/I 1%, top High  Some 
10 Sweden  Multi-domestic Geographic Low 1%, top High  Some 
11 Korea  Global Product Strict, F/I 5%, both Some no Strong 
12 Sweden Global Product Low 0% Some no Weak 
 
Internal factors discussed above might facilitate or constrain the process of transferring HRM 
practices from Western HQs to Russian subsidiaries. Table 5 shows the extent of 
standardization of HRM practices. Three companies (5, 10, 12) have a significantly low level 
of standardization. Table 4 indicates that such localization could be explained by 
subsidiaries’ weak dependence on HQ’s resources and the absence or small number of 
expatriates, who usually require a standard approach to their employment across the globe. A 
low level of control through formal and informal procedures also contributed to the autonomy 
of Russian subsidiaries in these companies.  
In contrast, companies 1, 3 and 4 show a high level of standardization of HRM 
practices at their Russian subsidiaries. All of these companies are of US origin, and have an 
ethnocentric approach.  
The Korean company has a global strategy, strict control, and strong dependence on 
HQ’s resources, therefore HRM practices are fairly standardized. 
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Table 5. Standardization of HRM practices at Russian subsidiaries 
N Origin Standardization 
R&S T&D C&B PA 
1 US some high high high 
2 US  high some some high 
3 US  high high high high 
4 US  some high  high high 
5 German  low low low low 
6 French  low some some low 
7 French  some some high high 
8 French  some some some some 
9 Swiss  high high high high 
10 Sweden  low low low high 
11 Korea  some some some high 
12 Sweden low low low low 
 
The theoretical propositions describe local HRM practices, which are shaped by 
National Business System and therefore should be found in companies operating in this 
environment. However, in MNCs there are other factors that might influence the process of 
HRM formation. In this article we concentrate on those HRM practices shaped by the 
Business System. Among such practices we have observed in the Russian subsidiaries the 
following: recruitment through personal contacts, selection of experienced employees, 
extensive training, direct supervision, individual negotiation for compensation, personal 
evaluation of performance, high reward differentials, profit sharing rewards, and appraisal for 
results or financial output. Table 6 presents a summary of research, listing local HRM 
practices at Russian subsidiaries of Western MNCs.  
 
Table 6. Local HRM practices at Russian subsidiaries of Western MNCs 
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1 US  + +       
2 US + + +   + +   
3 US  +    +   + 
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4 US + + +       
5 German +  +  + + +   
6 French + + + +   + +  
7 French   +  +    +  
8 French   + + +  +    
9 Swiss    +       
10 Sweden  + + +  +     
11 Korea  +  +       
12 Sweden + +   + +    
 
Despite an assumed convergence resulting from the globalization process and the 
weakness of formal institutions in a host environment, MNCs adapt to the Russian context to 
a high extent. National cultural and institutional features force practices to mutate. Below, we 
describe examples of several HRM practices, which were adapted to the Russian 
environment, and their related reasons.  
Recruitment and Selection 
Scholars who studied HRM practices at Russian subsidiaries argued that the hiring 
process in Russia is very challenging due to the very weak information flow and the more 
heterogeneous population in terms of level and quality of education, expectations, and values 
(Fey, et al., 1999). Therefore, MNCs have to rely mostly on headhunter firms that play 
intermediate roles between the company and job seekers, as well as advertisements in 
newspapers. Our empirical study of Western MNCs in Russia has supported these arguments, 
observing in all cases the use of headhunter firms in big cities and advertisements in 
newspapers in remote areas. As with Russian companies we found extensive use of personal 
contacts and referrals. This approach was always considered as a part of Russian culture and 
has successfully found its application in modern business, where MNCs benefit from it as 
well. 
As for selection criteria, two additional points were important for all the MNCs: 
education and competence. Typical for Russia, personal connections were desired in a few 
companies for top managers. Graduate recruitment was still represented in US companies, 
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while most of the French and German companies expressed unwillingness to invest in a long-
term development strategy. An international manager pool was observed in every company.  
According to Whitley’s theory (1999), which describes a typical Russian firm as 
being ‘opportunistic’ with low investment in employee development, the main selection 
criteria in the Russian context would be experience. In the case of these MNCs, we found that 
employers were looking for candidates with previous work experience at a foreign firm as the 
main selection factor, and making little use of internships. All the studied MNCs strictly 
follow Russian labor law and hire employees after 3 months of probation.  
Training and Development 
Training is crucial in Russia because of the historical heritage of the Soviet Union, 
where a strongly centralized government system and educational gaps in business 
management put them far away from the Western market-oriented capitalism model.  
Many empirical studies confirm that in Russia, employees receive more training than 
in Western countries (Bjorkman’s et al., 2006).  In countries like Russia, training can be 
remedial, compensating for weaknesses in the education system (Goergen et al., 2012) or it 
can be an important source of competitive advantage (Jukova and Korotov, 1998; Zhukova 
and Korotov, 1998). Despite significant coordination of training and development programs 
from headquarters (Fey, et al., 1999), the content of training is less standardized in Russia, 
and it is provided in the local language for higher effectiveness (Bjorkman and Ehrnrooth, 
2000). These arguments are totally in line with our findings, where subsidiaries reported use 
of extensive training programs for all ranks of employees, which are provided locally in the 
local language, as well as at headquarters or world leading business schools for top 
management.  
The annual budget planning in different companies is tied to different references. In 
some cases, the planning is done according to the salary fund, while in others, planning for 
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KPI, headcount, and budgets for training programs are done according to the financial results 
of the previous year. Therefore, the frequency of providing such training also varies among 
companies. A minimum of 2-3 training sessions per year is offered by any company. For 
workers, it is mostly in the form of mentoring (for a German company) and online courses 
(for a US company), while for managers, it is usually in-class courses.  
As for topics, every company had courses in its arsenal like sales and marketing, 
effectiveness and leadership, and various technical training. Language courses were found in 
just a few companies. Development programs in most of the cases have an international 
character. The major difference between the studied companies was found at the level of the 
HQ’s influence on training and development programs. For US companies, such influence 
was high, with many courses being standardized and diffused to the subsidiary. In contrast, 
the influence is very low for the German company, where the subsidiary is free to design and 
select needed courses. The French HQ has some influence, playing the role of adviser and 
sending recommendations to its subsidiary.  
Appraisal 
In contrast to other HRM practices, which were fairly closely adapted to the local 
environment, in MNC Russian subsidiaries, a performance appraisal system and criteria used 
to determine promotions have been found to be highly standardized (Bjorkman and 
Ehrnrooth, 2000). Despite the culturally appropriate top-down evaluation in Russia, where 
superiors evaluate the subordinates, MNCs successfully added a reciprocal process (Fey et 
al., 1999). However, feedback at this point is most positively indirect, reflecting the low 
amount of individualism in Russian culture. Direct feedback may cause irreparable damage to 
the employee’s self-image and ruin loyalty to the organization (Elenkov, 1998). Referring to 
Whitley’s theory (1999), in a Russian firm, personal evaluation of performance and appraisal 
are common for determining results or financial output.  
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In our study, every company had an appraisal system based on various KPIs, with a 
common process of employee self-evaluation followed by an interview with the supervisor in 
which weaknesses and opportunities were discussed. In contrast to the German companies, in 
US and French companies, the appraisal process also involved peers and subordinates. As for 
the subject of evaluation, US companies differed from others in their stronger orientation 
toward results rather than toward the process of achieving the results. The appraisal system 
reported by US companies used a global standard practice diffused from HQ. In the German 
and French companies, the appraisal system was developed locally and had little influence 
from HQ. Among conflicting practices in the US subsidiary, it was found difficult to fire 
inefficient employees. Because of Russian labor law, a company cannot fire an employee in 
Russia as easily as in the USA.  
Compensation and Benefits 
The compensation system in Russia has to deal with a high turnover of employees 
(Shekshnia, 1998) so practices typical elsewhere may not be directly applicable (Mueller and 
Clarke, 1998). Research has found standardized performance based compensation systems, 
which was controlled from MNC headquarters (Bjorkman et al., 2007) with the salary 
structure is determined with input from the subsidiaries (Fey et al., 1999).  
Using Whitley’ (1999) terminology, the Russian context produces individual 
negotiation for compensation with high reward differentials and profit sharing rewards. The 
decentralized bargaining is explained by the weakness of trade unions and low cooperation 
among competitors. Worker-manager separation in their rewards occurs due to the cultural 
feature of high power distance. Finally, profit sharing rewards result from an unstable 
economy where employers tie compensation to the company’s business cycle.  
Our research supported all the above statements, finding in all studied companies a 
fixed salary and a high proportion of premiums as compensation tools. Rewards were tied to 
  
 
25 
the individual performance of employees or the financial results of the company. Another 
adjustment of compensation practices to the Russian context was the use of fixed term 
contracts, which helped to balance the unstable market environment and avoid difficulties of 
laying off people. So, a company usually hires term workers for the high season to cover the 
workforce deficit in the production line. In the US companies, short term employees are also 
in sales positions, which allows an employer to filter high potential employees easily.  
The degree of HQ influence on compensation policies was widespread, although the 
amounts were adjusted to local market conditions. Several of the MNCs said that their 
compensation and benefit system was developed in the subsidiary, and HQ had no other 
influence than recommendations. Respondents also noted that the compensation system was 
not influenced by trade unions. US and German companies had collective agreements. In 
general, trade unions are barely represented in these companies. Instead, some subsidiaries 
had organized an internal works council (Sovet trudovogo collectiva). This body helps 
workers, organizes sport events, and serves as a direct connector with the management of the 
company. The only reported conflict with a trade union was in one US company. 
Non-monetary benefits are important in the Russian context, and may serve as a 
retention tool (Fey et al., 1999). Practices include training, corporate cultural events, free 
meals, social activities, career development programs, and health insurance. Every subsidiary 
included health insurance, and in some cases, life insurance. For relocated employees, every 
company provided housing, and in some cases, schooling for children. Cars and mobile 
phones for managers were also common. Other benefits like fitness, paid education, paid 
parking, and credit cards existed but were rare among these MNCs. Instead, companies 
strictly fulfill Russian labor law requirements, providing to their employees state retirement, 
illness days off, and 28 days of paid vacation. All the companies used ‘immaterial’ benefits 
like one-to-one meetings with the GM or ‘well done’ emails from the board of directors.  
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Difference in working time showed US companies offering flexible hours and 
European companies requiring fixed hours. However, respondents from French companies 
expressed a desire to shift to flexible hours like at their HQ, and already provided some 
flexibility for managers. 
 
The only common factor in HQ’s influence on the benefits system were the expatriate 
packages diffused from HQ. The rest varied from extensive autonomy to standardized 
practices, indicating the important role of company strategy. As the HR manager of one US 
company stated, “Structure is diffused from HQ, but the amount is defined according to our 
assessment of performance and grade of the employee.” The manager from another US 
company mentioned, “there is a ‘library’ in HQ, and the subsidiary is free to choose.” The 
HR manager of a French company stated, “Principles of the social package and bonuses are 
partly diffused from HQ.” 
 
Conclusions 
This research shows that the business systems approach developed by Whitley (1999) 
can be useful for studying post USSR transiting economies like Russia. The propositions 
derived from the theory found their application in practice. Among host country effects this 
study observed that weak information flow on the labor market and weak trust outside of the 
personal networks makes recruitment through personal contacts more appropriate in Russia. 
The underdeveloped vocational training in business and gaps in Soviet public education 
forces MNCs to provide extensive training in order to comply with international standards 
and requirements. In the case of local business, weak trade unions and therefore decentralized 
bargaining allows individual negotiation for compensation and high wage differentials; 
however, in MNCs the reward system is more strictly controlled by headquarters. The home 
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country effects were quite powerful in MNCs originating from the USA, where levels of 
standardization were high. US companies are usually more standardized and tend to keep 
their business model unchanged across borders. Of course, such factors as the laws and 
regulations of the host country have to be respected by MNCs, forcing all of them to adapt. 
At this point, a company’s HQ offers the structure for all HRM practices, but the application 
and adjustment of these practices usually depends on the subsidiary. There are some practices 
in US companies which stand out in their standardization, like the appraisal system, corporate 
culture, managerial training programs, grading structure for compensation and benefits, 
reward and recognition policy, and to some extent, recruitment. However, these global 
American practices were still adapted to the local environment. German and Sweden 
companies contrary were found to be the most adapted to the host context. 
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